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ABSTRACT
Agricultural seed markets have experienced significant consolidation over the past
fifty years, apparently driven by private investment in research and development
(“R&D”) made profitable through extensive intellectual property protections. The
current intellectual property law regime on plants allows an innovator to obtain a
wide variety of protections on new plant varieties, whether created through natural
breeding processes or genetic engineering. Investment has paid off and the United
States has experienced significant benefits through increased productivity, meaning
we produce significantly more food today without using more land than our grandparents. However, agricultural markets deserve, and are often given, unique consideration because of the importance of the product. Competition in these markets may
be on the verge of breaking down. This Article explores the background and development of Intellectual Property (“IP”) law as it relates to self-replicating technologies (plants) and speculates on two ways legislators can promote and protect competition without destroying private incentive to innovate: extending research exceptions for universities and banning the development and use of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (“GURTs”).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property rights protecting self-replicating technologies (plants)
have exploded over the last several decades, making it one of the fastest growing
intellectual property (“IP”) law areas.1 Debate continues to rage over the appropriate balance between protecting inventors’ rights and promoting diffusion of innovations.2 Supporters of strong IP protection for inventors argue that research and
development (“R&D”) is prohibitively expensive without some way of guaranteeing a return on investment.3 They further argue badly needed innovations, which
benefit all of society, would never come to fruition without strong protection.4
Counter-arguments contend non-profit research, performed mostly by NGOs and
universities, are more than adequate to further society’s needs. Some even go as far
as arguing there is no empirical support for patent law in general. 5 Clear answers in
this debate require a strong understanding of economics and sufficient data to predict what would have been absent IP protection over plants, and reasonable experts
disagree. But what about when the inventors seek to protect their inventions (and
monopoly profits) by circumventing the legal system entirely? Is it appropriate for
an inventor, many of whom have benefited greatly from current IP laws, to use their
R&D to ensure their product only survives a single generation after sale?
This Article argues the interests IP law seeks to promote are thwarted if innovators can use Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (“GURTs”) to ensure monopoly profits. Additionally, in the unique industry of agriculture, which is vital to our
survival and growth, research should be encouraged in all possible avenues. Research exceptions to patent law infringement for research universities would help
ensure maximum possible development without jeopardizing private innovation.
Patent law exists to promote “the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”6 Generally speaking, patent protections represent a trade-off. Society allows otherwise
undesirable monopolization in exchange for incentivizing investment in innovation.7 Diffusion is an important part of the patent law scheme, meaning after the
inventor recoups their investment and receives a reasonable profit, society benefits
from the free exchange of inventions. Obviously, any monopoly power gained
through innovation and IP law protections is meant to be temporary.
But what if a firm took the benefits of their temporary monopoly and used those
profits to develop ways of permanently protecting their inventions through extralegal means, such that society may never gain unrestricted use of the invention?
This type of behavior could result from several different motivators. It may be that
traditional IP protections are inadequate to incentivize investment in the biotech
* Justin Brickey is law student at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of law.
1.See Sun Ling Wang et al., U.S. Agricultural Productivity Growth: The Past Challenges and the Future,
AMBER WAVES (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2015/september/us-agricultural-productivity-growth-the-past-challenges-and-the-future/.
2. Jason Savich, Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Negative Impact of Patent Exhaustion on Self-Replicating
Technology, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 115, 117 (2007). In this context, the term “consumer” includes
agricultural producers (farmers) who purchase the patent protected product from the inventor.
3. Id. at 129.
4. Id. at 120.
5. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 1
(2013).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980).
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industry since the invention is self-replicating and difficult to control once the first
sale is complete. Alternatively, biotech firms may be adequately protected by the
current law and are simply making rational business choices to limit cost in the long
run and secure profits for the future.
This Article argues current law adequately protects and incentivizes innovation
and that Congress should remove the temptation for biotech firms to waste resources developing genetic use restriction technology. Part II contains a brief introduction to GURTs and a survey of IP law as it concerns self-replicating bio-organisms. Part III examines the current state of the biotech market. Part IV examines
ways to improve the system to promote innovation while also protecting society’s
interests in competition and diffusion.

II: UNDERSTANDING GURTS AND THE CURRENT IP PROTECTION
FRAMEWORK OVER PLANTS

A. How GURTs work and why they were developed
Biotechnology firms began developing GURTs as a possible way to protect
their investment without resorting to patent enforcement.8 Initial development was
sponsored at least in part by the United States Department of Agriculture.9 GURTs
come in two basic forms. The first type is Variety GURT, commonly referred to as
a “terminator gene,” which control plant fertility by allowing the plant to developed
seeds but then poisoning each embryo after development.10 The second type, known
as “traitor genes,” are designed to turn a particular trait on or off. 11
News of the terminator gene’s development caused widespread condemnation
among various scientific and international governmental organization.12 Concerns
ranged from possible cross-breeding with wild plant populations to negative socioeconomic effects.13 For example, many poor farmers across the globe depend on
saving seeds from a crop to plant the next season.14 If GURTs were commercialized,
these farmers would be forced to purchase new seed each year, reducing their already thin profit-margins.15
Even some of the harshest critics of terminator genes admit that in some circumstances GURTs may be useful in preventing otherwise genetically modified

8. See Luca Lombardo, Genetic Use Restriction Technologies: A Review, 12 PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 995, 995 (2014).
9. See Scott Kilman, Monsanto Won’t Commercialize Terminator Gene, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
pg. B4 Oct. 5, 1999; see also Lombardo supra note 8 at 995.
10. Lombardo supra note 8 at 995.
11. Id. (“T-GURT (ironically known as traitor technology) is designed to switch on or off a trait (such
as herbicide/cold/drought/stress tolerance, pest resistance, germination, flowering, ripening, color, taste
and nutritional qualities of the plant, defense mechanisms, or production of industrial or pharmaceutical
compounds) using inducible promoters regulating the expression of the transgene through induced gene
silencing(e.g., by antisense suppression) or by excision of the transgene using a recombinase (FAO,
2001a).”).
12. Id. at 996.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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organisms from spreading into the wild and disrupting natural ecosystems. 16 Monsanto responded to growing popular concerns by announcing a pledge to not commercialize any plants containing the terminator gene.17 Arguments related to protecting natural wildlife from GMO encroachment aside, a reasonable question
arises: if this is the kind of less-than-beneficial-to-society R&D large biotechnology
firms are investing resources to develop, how should we react? On the one hand,
there is something perverse about a firm that has benefited under the current IP law
regime by obtaining a large market share to use their resources in a way which
benefits no one but their shareholders.18 On the other hand, IP law enforcement is
expensive and perhaps impossible in some developing countries that do not have an
effective enforcement mechanism.19 In typical markets, societal benefits may not
be a significant concern. Agricultural markets are different, since they produce a
basic human necessity. It is necessary to understand the general background of IP
law as it relates to plants in order to understand why some, including the USDA,
believed GURTs were a necessary and worthwhile development.

B. Intellectual Property Rights in the United States for selfreplicating biological organisms
For most of United States history, living microorganisms were beyond patent
protection.20 Beginning in the 1930s, Congress recognized that innovators should
receive just reward for their efforts, and therefore enacted a series of legislation
providing various forms of Intellectual Property Rights (“IPR”) for plants. 21 Today,
there are three basic methods for obtaining IPR for innovation in plant technology,
each with varying degrees of protection and application costs.
First, Congress passed the Plant Protection Act of 1930 (“PPA”), which allows
inventors to new patent varieties developed through cross-breeding.22 The patent
holder is able to prevent others from asexually reproducing the protected plant and
from using or selling the plant or its parts.23 Asexual reproduction includes growing
a plant from cuttings, budding, and grafting two different plants together.24 The description requirements are less stringent under the PPA then in a typical patent
16. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Report of the Panel of Eminent Experts
on Ethics in Food and Agriculture, Risks, Uncertainties and Doubts in the use of GMOs, (2001)
http://www.fao.org/3/x9600e/x9600e06.htm#P12_3335; see also Lombardo, supra note 8, at 1000–01.
17. Kilman, supra note 9. At the time Monsanto made the promise, it did not own the terminator gene
patent but had announced merger plans with Delta & Pine Land who had developed the gene in conjunction with the USDA. Id.
18. See infra, Section III.
19. Lombardo, supra note 8, at 1000–01.
20. See Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777,
777 (1992); Funk Bros. Seeds Co. v. KaloInoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (holding that a combination
of biological organisms was not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
21. 35 U.S.C. §§161–164 (1998).35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2018) (“Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and
new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than
a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2018).
24. Timothy P. Daniels, Keep the License Agreements Coming: The Effects of J.E.M Ag Supply, Incorporated v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Incorporated on Universities’ Use of Intellectual Property
Laws to Protect Their Plant Genetic Research, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 771, 775 (2003).
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application under 35 U.S.C. § 101.25 Applications under the PPA are less expensive
than those under a utility patent, but PPA only protects a narrow type of innovation
with limited commercial use.26 The PPA contains no enumerated research exception, which may be understandable considering the time period in which it was enacted.27
Adding an additional method for protecting plant innovation, Congress enacted
the Plant Variety Protection Act in 1970 (“PVPA”). 28 The PVPA allows a breeder
of a sexually reproduced, tuber propagated, or asexually reproduced plant variety
to obtain protection for a unique plant variety.29 Various parts of the PVPA evidence
Congressional concern for society’s unique interest in agriculture. 30 A major distinction from the PPA is the PVPA’s research exception.31 Plants protected under
the PVPA are still usable without infringement by virtually anyone conducting research. Farmers are also permitted to save seeds from PVPA protected plants so
long as they purchased the seed originally in a bona fide sale for a purpose other
than reproduction.32 Anyone can use protected varieties in cross breeding so long
as they are not later marketing a derivative product.33 Reading these provisions as a
whole gives the distinct impression that Congress is deeply concerned with both
innovating plant development and protecting the downstream consumer, including,
in the case of food crops, the farmer and the consumer who ultimately eats the product.
Lastly, biotech inventors may also apply for a utility patent under 35 U.S.C. §
101.34 These protections are the most stringent available, lasting 20 years, and the
most expensive and difficult to obtain.35 Protections for plants under § 101 have
only recently been allowed. For almost 200 years, living matter was thought to be
unpatentable.36 However, that changed in 1980 with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, where the Court held genetically engineered organisms
were patentable under § 101.37 The Court’s holding hinged on the distinction between human-made organism and those occurring naturally.38 Where the inventor
has created something through research that does not occur in nature, it may be
patentable under § 101 even though it is a living organism. The Court considered
the argument that by enacting the PPA and PVPA, Congress had expressed its intent

25. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018); 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2018) (“No plant patent shall be declared invalid for
noncompliance with section 112 if the description is as complete as is reasonably possible.”).
26. See Savich, supra note 2.
27. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164.
28. Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582 (2018).
29. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2018).
30. 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2018) (reserving the right for the Secretary of the Plant Variety Protection Office
to allow open use of a protected variety “in order to insure an adequate supply of fiber, food, or feed in
this country [where] [] the owner is unwilling or unable to supply the public needs for the variety at a
price which may reasonably be deemed fair.”).
31. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2018).
32. Id.
33. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(1-4) (2018).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
35. See generally Ko, supra note 20
36. See generally Id.; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1989).
37. See Diamond, 447 U.S. at 318; Ko, supra note 20 at 777.
38. See Diamond, 447 U.S. at 313 (“Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not
between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and humanmade inventions. Here, respondent’s micro-organism is the result of human ingenuity and research.”)
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to exclude living organisms from § 101 protection.39 Ultimately, the Court was justifiably unpersuaded by this argument.40
The PPA was most likely enacted for just the opposite reason as exclusion: it
was passed to include plant innovators in the IPR scheme. As the Court points out,
Congress most likely enacted the PPA as a way to circumvent the restrictions plant
innovators faced when applying for a patent under § 101.41 First, products of nature
were generally considered beyond the scope of patent protections, meaning all plant
innovations were technically unpatentable.42 Second, plant innovators could not
meet the strict written description requirements of § 101.43 The PPA and, to a lesser
extent, the PVPA were designed to reward and incentivize innovators, not make a
policy statement that Congress intended to keep plants outside traditional IPR protection.44
In all fairness, some PVPA provisions seem to indicate Congress was willing
to limit IP rights in plants for several reasons.45 As discussed below, the Court
would have another opportunity to consider a slight variation of the same argument.46 The key takeaway from the Court’s decision Chakrabarty is that a wide
array of human-made biological organisms, including plants, are patentable under
§ 101.47 To qualify for a utility patent, a plant innovator “must show that he has
developed a new, useful, and non-obvious” plant, meet the written description requirements of § 112, and deposit a sample of seed that is available to the public. 48
A “trade secret” is a form of intellectual property law that can protect a developer’s methodology.49 Trade secret law combined with hybrid plant development
can help protect a plant breeder’s innovations. However, they are important for hybrid varieties which cannot self-pollinate,50 where commercialized seeds ensure hybrid vigor only for the first generation of plants. 51 The valuable information is in
the parent lines, which typically are not commercialized.52 Subsequent generations
are significantly less productive, creating an incentive to buy new seed each
39. Id. at 310–315.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 310–312.
42. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311–312 (1980).
43. Id.
44. See Savich, supra note 2 (discussing economic theories behind IPR in the plant research context).
45. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164; see also Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§2321-2582.
46. See infra pp. 9–13
47. See also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013) (unanimous
decision confirming that naturally occurring DNA, despite the difficulty of identifying it, is unpatentable
but DNA that has been modified through human intervention is patentable).
48. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001) (citing 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101–103, 112, and 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801–1.809).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
“[T]he term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas,
designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible
or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if-(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain
economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.”
50. Lombardo, supra note 8, at 1000.
51. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1233–35 (8th Cir. 1994).
52. See Id. at 1226–1246.
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season.53 Pioneer v. Holden demonstrated that the law of trade secrets is another
method for protecting investment in plant innovation by holding the defendant liable for violating Pioneer’s trade secrets in its popular corn line. 54 Hybrids essentially
operate as a ‘natural’ IP protection.55

C. Additional case law development post-Chakrabarty
A variation of the argument raised in Chakrabarty was litigated again in J.E.M.
Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer.56 Pioneer brought a patent infringement claim against
J.E.M. for violating the licensing agreement contained on its bags of hybrid corn. 57
J.E.M. countered with a general denial and an affirmative defense of patent invalidity, arguing that sexually reproducing plants are not patentable under § 101 and that
the PPA and PVPA, as the more specific statutes, are meant to be the exclusive
means of protecting plants.58 Specific to the PPA, J.E.M. argued Congress considered plants beyond the scope of § 101 when it specifically limited the PPA to asexually reproduced plants, because if they thought plants were patentable under § 101
there would be no reason for additional protections.59 The Court began by reiterating its holding in Chakrabarty, first noting the critical distinction between what is
patentable versus unpatentable is not its status as living or inanimate, but rather
whether it has been altered by humans into something that does not occur in nature.60 Second, the Court held that the PPA is restricted to asexually reproduced
plants because Congress could not have anticipated that plant science would eventually allow plant breeders to produce stable characteristics through sexual reproduction.61 In other words, the Court contends that Congress did not think it was
necessary to protect sexually reproduced plants since they thought no useful varieties could be produced that way.62 Finally, the Court pointed out that until 1924,
most farmers received free seed from the government.63 This means commercial
interests were drastically different than they are now, since producers in the fledgling seed market were primarily concerned with commoditizing seed in general.
The Court was simply unwilling to make any negative inferences from Congress’s
intent behind the PPA.
J.E.M.’s argument stemming from the PVPA was more compelling (although
equally unsuccessful). The PVPA granted specific, limited patent-like protection
for sexually reproduced plants. As discussed above, several provisions of the PVPA
seem to indicate Congress’s intent to limit IPR protections, especially where food
crops are concerned.64 The Court was unpersuaded, finding it easy to reconcile the
53. Lombardo, supra note 8, at 1000.
54. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 35 F.3d at 1243.
55. The word ‘natural’ here is meant to denote normal plant reproductive processes. It is not meant to
imply that hybrids developed through selective breeding would necessarily occur in nature.
56. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145-146 (2001).
57. Id. at 128-29.
58. Id. at 129.
59. Id. at 132.
60. Id. at 134.
61. Id. at 135.
62. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 136 (2001) (citing E. Sinnott,
Botany Principles and Problems 266-267 (1935) & J. Priestley & L. Scott, Introduction to Botany 530
(1938)).
63. Id. at 136.
64. Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582 (2018); 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2018).
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PVPA and § 101 since: (1) the PVPA contains no express exclusionary language
and (2) it is harder to qualify for a patent under § 101 than with a PVP certificate,
therefore “it only makes sense that utility patents would confer a greater scope of
protection.”65 In essence, the Court found that the PVPA’s limited scope and specific provisions for protecting societal interests weigh against finding Congressional intent to otherwise exclude sexually reproduced plants from § 101. The Court
found other reasons to hold the two provisions can co-exist, namely that utility patents require greater disclosure and repository of physical material accessible to the
public, while PVP certificates do not.66 Additionally, the Court is bound by precedent which prevents it from invalidating two statutes that are capable of co-existing
without resulting in inconsistent outcomes.67
In dissent, Justice Breyer wrote that he would have decided along the lines argued by J.E.M., that Congress intended IPR in living plants to be regulated by the
two more specific statutes.68 Ultimately, IP rights in living plants are now well established within United States jurisprudence. Statistics show productivity in the agricultural industry has steadily increased over the last fifty years without a corresponding increase in farmed land.69 For example, soybean yields per acre have doubled since 1948 and corn yields have quadrupled.70 A significant reason for the increased productivity is R&D, much of which, as discussed above, is capable of being protected under IP law.71 Private sector R&D has grown by over one-third since
the 1980s,72 possibly as a reaction to Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty which, as discussed above, held living organisms could be protected
under a utility patent so long as they were human-made and not naturally occurring.73 Shortly after the Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, the United States Patent
and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, held in Ex Parte
Hibberd that plant life was patentable under § 101.74 With all three federal branches
in agreement, investors after 1985 could be confident that any new and useful innovation would bring monopoly profits, thereby justifying risky R&D investment.

D. Enforcement Costs
Gaining a patent and marketing a successful product is only one part of profiting from patent protected innovation. Patent protection can only be effective if consumers believe patent holders will take action to enforce their rights, especially for
a self-replicating technology like a plant. Seed producers like Monsanto have
65. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., at 138.
66. Id. at 142-44.
67. Id. at 143-44 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551(1976) (“when two statutes are capable
of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective”)).
68. Id. at 147 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
69. ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ADMIN. PUB. NO. 083, AG AND FOOD STATISTICS:
CHARTING THE ESSENTIALS, FEBRUARY 2020 11-12 (2020).
70. Wang et al. supra note 1.
71. See Id.
72. Id.
73. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
74. Hibberd, et al., 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 444 (B.P.A.I. 1985) (The examiner, who had denied various
applications related to maize, unsuccessfully defended its decision in part by arguing the PPA of 1930
and the PVPA of 1970 evidenced Congressional intent to exclude plant life from patentability under §
101.)
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engaged in vigorous enforcement actions, spending significant sums investigating
and prosecuting IP infringements.75 By 2012, Monsanto had filed over 140 lawsuits
and collected more than $23 million in judgements.76 Importantly, the Supreme
Court has held the first sale doctrine, first articulated in Adams v. Burke,77 does not
apply to patent protected seeds.78 The Court’s unanimous decision in Bowman v.
Monsanto Co. held that farmers who save patent protected seed for replanting in a
subsequent season cannot use the first sale doctrine as a defense against a patent
infringement suit.79 Typically, a patentee losses all ability to restrict use of an item
after the first authorized sale.80 Bowman argued that by saving the seed he was
simply using the items as farmers had always done.81 The Court rejected his argument, finding that by using seed saved from one season to plant in a later season,
Bowman was actually replicating patented technology without a license to do so.82
The Court’s decision sent a clear message: farmers who violate license agreements
on patented plants do so at their own peril.
With the law definitively settled, agricultural innovators can be confident that
enforcement endeavors will be effective at preventing infringement. Of course, investigating violations is difficult and expensive. Farmers are certainly not going to
advertise violations. However, Monsanto clearly demonstrated biotech firms can
investigate and successfully prosecute violators.83 Given their significant market
power, major seed producers are in a good position to pass on any enforcement costs
to the consumers.84

III. CURRENT STATE OF THE AGRICULTURAL BIOTECH INDUSTRY:
MOVING TOWARD CONSOLIDATION

Over the last 50 years, the private agricultural industry has experienced significant consolidation and the effects are easily demonstrated by the controversy surrounding the merger of Bayer and Monsanto.85 On May 29, 2018, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the merger of the two
biotech giants under § 7 of the Clayton Act.86 The DOJ was concerned that the
merger would substantially eliminate competition in several important agricultural
markets.87 Monsanto and Bayer represented two sides of the same coin that is modern agricultural business: they both developed and sold ‘systems’ designed to
75. Center for Food Safety & Save Our Seeds, Seed Giants vs. U.S. Farmers, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY
6 (2013), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/seed-giants_final_04424.pdf.
76. Id.
77. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873).
78. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 287 (2013).
79. Id. at 289.
80. Id. at 283.
81. Id. at 287.
82. Id. at 283.
83. Center for Food Safety and Save Our Seeds, supra note 7; Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S.
278, 278 (2013).
84. See Complaint, United States v. Bayer AG and Monsanto Co., No. 1:18-cv-01241, 2018 WL
2417887 (D.D.C. May 29, 2018); Center for Food Safety and Save Our Seeds, supra note 75; Bowman,
569 U.S. at 278.
85. Bayer, 2018 WL 2417887.
86. See Complaint, Bayer, 2018 WL 2417887.
87. See Complaint, Bayer, 2018 WL 2417887.
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increase productivity through combining chemicals and genetically modified plant
varieties and were virtually the only competitors in certain markets. 88 Specifically,
the DOJ alleged the merger would all but eliminate competition in the markets for
three U.S. crops: cotton, canola, and soybeans.89 Herbicide and pesticide development has become intertwined with genetically modified plant varieties, which are
engineered to withstand high exposure levels, and the two companies were the only
major competitors in many markets.90 For example, Monsanto’s “Roundup Ready”
soybeans were engineered for use alongside their herbicide (Roundup), greatly increasing the soybeans’ resistance to the herbicide. The DOJ argued Bayer produced
the only competitive alternative to Monsanto’s weed-control systems.91
The merger was allowed to proceed only after Bayer agreed to divest $9 billion
in assets to BASF (Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik), making it one of the largest
divestment agreements in United States history.92 The divestment included all of
Bayer’s businesses in the canola, cotton, soybean, and vegetable seed markets. 93
The important thing to take away from this merger is the insight it provides into the
current market concentration in several key agricultural industries. Pre-merger,
Bayer and Monsanto had a combined market share of approximately 59% of genetically modified cotton seeds sold in the United States, 94 74% market share of genetically modified canola seeds,95 and a significant portion of soybean seeds.96
Monsanto’s only competitors in the soybean market either relied on licenses for
Roundup Ready traits or used post-patent versions of the original Roundup Ready
trait.97 This case demonstrated that many agricultural seed markets in the United
States are highly concentrated and dominated by private mega-firms like Bayer and
BASF, who have profited from extensive investment in R&D. These innovations
are typically patent protected and have revolutionized American food production.98
Patents are designed to reward innovation by allowing an inventor of a useful
new product to collect monopoly profits for a limited time.99 Patent law reflects a
theoretical bargain between the inventor and society. The inventor is allowed a
time-limited monopoly and society is rewarded with unrestricted use of the invention after the period ends.100 There is a delicate balance, however, between stimulating innovation and preventing societal harms resulting from failed market competition.101 Evaluating the effects of patent protections on competition in the
88. Id. at pg. 2.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. United States v. Bayer AG, No. 18-1241, 2019 WL 1431903, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2019); Dan
Mangan, US Forces Germany’s Bayer to shed $9 billion in ag business in biggest ever antitrust sell-off,
CNBC (May 29, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/29/bayer-will-sell-basf-9-billion-in-assets-toallow-monsanto-purchase.html.
93. Bayer AG, 2019 WL 1431903, at *2, *4.
94. Complaint at pg. 9, Bayer AG, No. 1:18-cv-01241, 2018 WL 2417887.
95. Complaint at pg. 10, Bayer AG, No. 1:18-cv-01241, 2018 WL 2417887.
96. Complaint at pg. 11, Bayer AG, No. 1:18-cv-01241, 2018 WL 2417887.
97. Id.
98. See Wang et al. supra note 1.
99. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
100. Kris J. Kostolansky and Daniel Salgado, Does the Experimental Use Exception in Patent Law
Have a Future?, 47 COLO. LAW. 32 (2018).
101. See generally, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAWS OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 22–33 (West Academic Publishing, 5th ed. 2015)(discussing societal
harms of monopoly).
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agricultural industry, which includes many distinct markets, is beyond the scope of
this Article. There is ongoing debate as to whether the current plant-related IP
scheme is beneficial to society, i.e., whether the current protections strike the appropriate balance between stimulating innovation while maintaining efficient market competition.102 If we assume the theoretical premise behind patent law is true
and patent protections stimulate innovation by offering monopoly profit rewards,
then the increased productivity in United States agriculture following private investment in agricultural R&D is probably the result of modern IP law developments.
It is also clear that several key agricultural markets have experienced significant
consolidation.103
With key agricultural markets dominated by a few large international firms,
incentives to innovate provided by patent protections are probably less important.
The firms must continue to innovate or risk losing their market position. R&D costs
necessary to develop competitive plant traits represent a significant barrier to entry
into markets dominated by genetically modified seeds.104 It may be time to re-examine the actual balance in the agricultural industry between innovators’ need for
monopoly profits and society’s benefit in subsequent use of the invention. Regardless of whether the current regime is a net positive for society, there is no need to
allow continued development of systems designed to ensure perpetual monopolies.
Additionally, industry giants are unlikely to face a credible threat from research
universities, but society stands to gain significant benefits from a robust research
exception to patent infringement. These ideas are more fully explored in the next
section.

IV. SOLUTIONS: PROTECTING RESEARCH EXCEPTIONS AND
RESTRICTING GENETIC USE RESTRICTION TECHNOLOGIES
A. Expanding research exceptions for universities
Experimental use is a defense against a patent infringement claim. 105 This defense arises from the same interests underpinning the experimental use doctrine,
which allows an inventor to test their invention publicly before filing for a patent.106
Under the experimental use defense, a potential infringer must show they used the
patented invention “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”107 Research universities operated for some time under the belief
that they could not be held liable for patent infringement so long as they limited

102. Compare Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 1 (2013), with Jacob Moscona, Flowers of Invention: Patent Protection and Productivity
Growth in US Agriculture, (July 27, 2020) (on file with the Department of Economics, M.I.T.).
103. See generally Complaint, United States v. Bayer AG and Monsanto Co., No. 1:18-cv-01241, 2018
WL 2417887 (D.D.C. May 29, 2018).
104. See generally Moscona, supra note 102.
105. Kostolansky, supra note 100 at 36.
106. City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877) (establishing the experimental use exception to the public use bar to patent protection); see also Kostolansky, supra note
100 at 33-36.
107. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Roche Products,
Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (suspended by statute related to development of pharmaceuticals)).
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their use of patented inventions to furthering their research endeavors. 108 But the
Federal Circuit in Madey v. Duke drastically limited the scope of the exception as
applied to private research universities.109 The court held the research exception
does not shield universities from liability when “the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry…”110 The holding affects private institutions disproportionately to public ones since sovereign immunity insulates public research universities from suit.111
The court’s holding attempts to correct an apparent imbalance in the way the
research exception had been applied. Universities, both public and private, were
able to use patent protections to profit from innovation but were essentially immune
to liability.112 Far from using patented inventions for purely philosophical inquiry,
institutions were able to earn substantial profits enforcing their patent rights. 113
Blanket research exceptions may run contrary to IP law’s theoretical underpinnings, but society’s interests in agricultural development are better served by the
pre-Madey research exception. Agricultural innovators are not competing to develop ‘a better mouse-trap,’ or build the next iPhone. Instead, the results of their
innovations may increase access to a basic human necessity. A statutory repeal of
Madey, with some additional tailoring, would leave intact traditional patent incentives for private innovators while simultaneously increasing overall development
and possibly introducing some healthy competition into concentrated markets. Additionally, university researchers (and offices of general counsel) would conserve
significant resources now used to investigate potential patent violations in agricultural research projects.

B. Prohibition of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies
Governments around the world reacted with great suspicion when GURTs first
gained notoriety.114 Following recommendations from the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, countries like Canada and India prohibited field testing
and commercialization of GURTs.115 Public concern centered on the unknown and
potentially negative environmental impacts of GURTs. 116 In support of GURTs,
some scholars have speculated they could be used to stop genetically modified
plants from contaminating wild ecosystems.117 However, if a genetically modified
plant is potentially so dangerous that rendering it infertile is necessary to stop it
from spreading, then perhaps we should consider whether such a plant should be
used at all. Leaving aside unknown environmental impacts, there is an economic

108. Kostolansky, supra note 100 at 36.
109. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
110. Id.
111. Kostolansky, supra note 100 at 38.
112. Id.at 36.
113. Id.
114. Lombardo supra note 8 at 1000.
115. Id. at 996; Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs), GOV’T OF CAN. (May 19, 2012),
https://www.inspection.gc.ca/plant-health/plants-with-novel-traits/general-public/gurts/eng/1337406710213/1337406801948.
116. Lombardo supra note 8 at 1000.
117. See Id.
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reason to prohibit GURTs. They can be used to guarantee monopoly profits on new
genetic traits indefinitely.
Agricultural seed and chemical developers could use GURTs to circumvent
costly patent applications and enforcement litigation. For example, if a company
developed a new herbicide-ready soybean variety and equipped it with a GURT
which prevents farmers (or anyone else) from saving seed from the first planting,
they could forgo patenting the product since it would be impossible for anyone to
replicate it through normal reproduction. A GURT-equipped seed would not need
to be patented since it would be impossible to save seeds from one crop to plant the
next season.118 Nothing could compel the company to enter their new variety into
the public domain and there would be no time limit on their new monopoly. GURTs
provide no obvious benefit to society, yet the risks to the environment and market
competition is clear.119 Since the developer of a GURT-equipped seed would not
have to worry about patenting their product to ensure monopoly profits, they would
never need to disclose their innovation to the public, meaning generic versions
would be difficult or impossible to develop. Public outcry originally kept GURTs
from being commercialized.120 Public sentiment, however, is a fickle thing. If fear
of GURTs ever dissipates, there is nothing to prevent agri-business giants from taking advantage of them, circumventing the IP scheme altogether and potentially decreasing competition in an already highly concentrated area.
One reasonable economic argument in support of GURTs is that companies
will save money on IP enforcement actions, which may lead to lower prices. However, this would only happen if the GURT users were operating in a competitive
market. As we have seen, many seed markets are not highly competitive and there
is thus no reason to expect a market participant to lower prices after obtaining an
indefinite monopoly on a new innovation.
Detractors may further argue that a company able to develop a product incapable of being replicated by its competitors is entitled to whatever benefits result, even
a de facto monopoly. For-profit corporations, after all, have an obligation to their
shareholders to pursue profit-seeking behavior.121 There may come a time when
public sentiment against GURTs wanes to the point where it would be profitable
for a developer to implement them in a commercial line. We should not rely on seed
producers to voluntarily exclude GURTs from their products forever. 122
A few uncertain benefits do not outweigh the potentially enormous cost to competition. Since the potential harm is great and any benefits are small and speculative,
Congress should utilize its broad power under the commerce clause to ban GURTequipped organisms from being sold in in the United States.123 Congress could determine a ban on GURTs is rationally related to protecting market competition, the
environment, and society’s interest in maintaining affordable food products.

118. Id. at 996.
119. See Id. at 1002.
120. Id.
121. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (2012).
122. Kilman, supra note 9.
123. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565–68 (1995) (“We do not doubt that Congress has authority
under the Commerce Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially affect interstate commerce…”).
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V. CONCLUSION
Agricultural innovations continue to increase productivity in the United States.
Patent protections for crop plants are firmly established in our jurisprudence and
provide ample protection to innovators, incentivizing private investment in R&D
through the promise of limited monopoly profits. However, the numerous agricultural seed markets have become highly concentrated, diminishing competition and
threatening to reduce incentives to innovate. Therefore, our government should
carefully scrutinize current market conditions to ensure society’s interests are not
being unduly subjugated to corporate profits. Two ways of safeguarding society’s
interests are increasing research exceptions available to all research institutions and
eliminating GURTs as a method of circumventing IP law. 124

124. See e.g. Kilman, supra note 9; Lombardo, supra note 8; Ko, supra note 20.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol4/iss2/7

14

